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CASE COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEARCH AND SEIZURE -
RANDOM AUTOMOBILE STOPS LACKING
REASONABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL VIOLATION
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
A patrolman stopped an automobile occupied' by the
respondent and seized marihuana which was in plain view on the
floor. 2 At a hearing to suppress the marihuana seized as a result of
1. Delaware v. Prouse, __ U.S. -, -, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1394 (1979). The Delaware
Supreme Court referred to respondent as the operator of the vehicle, see State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d
1359, 1361 (1978). The arresting officer testified to the contrary, and the trial court in its ruling on
the motion to suppress referred to respondent as one of the four "occupants" of the vehicle. The
vehicle was registered to respondent. Id. at -_, 99 S. Ct. at 1394 n.l.
2. Id at -, 99 S. Ct. at 1394. The respondent was indicted for possession of a non-narcotic
substance under title 16 section 4754 of the Delaware Code which provides:
It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess, use or con-
sume any controlled substance or counterfeit substance classified in Schedule I, II, II,
IV or V not a narcotic drug unless the substance was obtained directly from or pur-
suant to a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. Any person
who violates this section upon conviction shall be fined not more than $500 and im-
prisoned not more than 2 years.
16 DEL. CODE ANN. S 4754 (Supp. 1978).
Title 16, Section 4701(5) of the Delaware Code, in pertinent part, defines a "controlled sub-
stance" as "a drug, substance, or immediate precursor in Schedules I through V of Subchapter II."
16 DEL. CODE ANN. 54701 (5) (1975).
Title 16, section 4714 of the Delaware Code states, in pertinent part: "(a) The controlled
substances listed in this section are included in Schedule' . . . .(e) Any material, compound
combination, Mixture, synthetic substitute or preparation which contains any quantity of
marihuana .... 16 DEL. CODE ANN. §4 7 14(a) (e)(1975 and Supp. 1978).
The Court in Prouse stated that the marihuana seized was in "plain view" on the car floor.
-U.S. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 1394. In certain situations, police may make a warrantless seizure of
evidence which is in plain view. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). In order to
make a plain view seizure three conditions must be met: (1) There must be prior justification for the
officer's presence at the place where the object is in plain view; (2) discovery of the evidence must be
inadvertant; and (3) it must be immediately apparent to the officer that he has incriminating eviden-
ce before him. Id. at 466. Thus, "objects falling in the plain view ofan officer who has a right to be in
the position to have that view are suiject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence." Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
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the stop, the patrolman testified that prior to the stop he had
observed neither traffic nor equipment violations, nor had he any
indication that criminal activity had been or would be perpetrated
by the respondent. 3 The patrolman testified that the respondent's
car was randomly chosen from other vehicles on the road to be the
subject of a license and registration check that was routinely made
when not answering complaints. 4 The patrolman was not acting
pursuant to any standards, guidelines, or procedures pertaining to
document spot checks, promulgated either by his department or by
the state attorney general. 5 The trial court granted the respondent's
motion to suppress the seized marihuana 6 and, upon appeal, the
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.7 On writ of certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that except in
situations where the police have "reasonable and articulable"
suspicion that a driver is operating his vehicle without a valid
driver's license or automobile registration certificate, or has
otherwise violated a criminal law making him subject to seizure,
stopping an automobile to check the driver's license and
automobile registration is an unreasonable search and seizure in
violation of the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution.8 Delaware v. Prouse, - U. S. -, 99 S. Ct. 1391
(1979).
3. Delaware v. Protse, -U S ... __ 99S. Ct. 1391, 1394(1979).
4. State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359, 1361 (Del. 1978).
5. __ U.S. at __, 99 St. Ct. at 1394.
6. Id. at -_, 99 S. Ct. at 1394. The trial court held the stop and detention wholly capricious
and, therefore, in violation of the fourth amendment. Id.
7. 382 A.2d at 1364. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that "a random stop of a
motorist in the absence of specific articulable facts which justify the stop by indicating a reasonable
suspicion that a violation of the law has occurred is constitutionally impermissible and violative of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.'! Id.
The respondent appealed pursuant to Section 9902 of Title Ten of the Delaware Code which
provides in part as follows:
(b) When any order is entered before trial in any court suppressing or excluding sub-
stantial and material evidence, the court, upon certification by the Attorney General
that the evidence is essential to the prosecution of the case, shall dismiss the complaint,
indictment or information or any count titereofto the proof of which the evidence sup-
pressed or excluded is essential. Upon ordering the complaint, indictment or in-
formation or any count thereof dismissed pursuant to the Attorney General's cer-
tification, the resons of the dismissal shall be set forth in the order entered upon the
record.
(c) The State shall have an absolute right of appeal to an appellate court from an order
entered pursuant to subsection (b) of this section and if the appellate court upon review
of the order suppressing evidence shall reverse the dismissal, the defendant may be
suujected to trial.
10 DEL. CoDe ANN. § 9902 (b)(c) (1975).
North Dakota provides for a similar procedure in Section 29-28-07 (5) of the North Dakota Cen-
try Code (Supp. 1979).
8. __ U.S. at __ , 99 S. Ct. at 1401. The Court immediately narrowed its holding by
declaring that the states are not preclded from developing methods for spot checks that involve less
intrusion and do not allow unconstrained discretion. Id. Nor are the states restricted from using truck
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The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures. 9
Historically, this procedural safeguard was a direct result of the
events preceding the revolutionary struggle against England. 10 The
fourth amendment was a response to English monarchial and
parliamentary police practices, some of which were later adopted in
colonial America. 11
The suggestion that the fourth amendment protects people
from conviction for crimes proved by evidence procured through an
unreasonable search and seizure was first made in Boyd v. United
States.1" In Boyd, the United States Supreme Court implied that
evidence secured by means of an unconstitutional search and
seizure is inadmissible in federal court. 3 The implication in Boyd
was made explicit in Weeks v. United States, 14 in which the Court
enunciated the exclusionary rule under which evidence seized
during an unlawful search could not constitute proof against the
defendant in a federal criminal prosecution.15 The Court in Weeks
reasoned that if evidence seized in violation of the Constitution
could be introduced at trial, the protection of the fourth
weigh station and inspection checkponts at which some vehicles might be detained for safety and
regulatory inspections. Id. at __, 99 S. Ct. at 1401 n.26.
9. The fourth amendment provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
623-35 (1886). See alsoJ. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT, 19 (1966).
11. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 623-35
(1886). See also W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 4 (1978). In
England, the power to search was originally used to restrict fredom of the press. In 1538, Henry VIII
expanded the scope of searches tinder a licensing system. Later, these powers became almost
,nlimited kinder authorization by the Star Chamber and, later, Parliament. Not tntil Howe v.
Wood, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153 (1763), and Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials
1029 (1765), did the idea that people should be protected from arbitrary searches tinder general
warrants gain recognition.
Similarly, in the pre-revolution colonies, writs of assistance were commonly used to authorize
general customs searches for smuggled goods. The use of writs was vigorously opposed by the
wealthy merchant interests. Protection from writs of assistance, however, was not mandated in the
grievances in the Declaration of Independence, and was not provided for in the draft constitution
drawn during the Constittional Convention in 1789. As a result of national criticism, a bill of rights
was later added which included the fourth amendment in its present form. W. LAFAVE, SEARCH &
SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 3-5 (1978).
12. 116 U.S. 616(1886).
13. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886). The Court held that the compulsory
production ofprivate books and papers by the owner of goods in a customs revenue suit, to be used as
evidence against him at trial was, in effect, compelling the owner to be a witness against himself, con-
trary to the fifth amendment of the Constitution. Further, the Court equated this comptlsory
production of evidence with an unreasonable search and seizLure tinder the fouirth amendment. Id. at
635, and called unconstitutional the proceeding during which such evidence was introdtced. Id. at
638. SeealsoJ. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE ANt) THE SUPREME COURT, 62 (1966).
14. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
15. Weeks v. United States. 232 U.S. 383. 398 (1914).
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amendment would be illusory.' 6 Thus, the exclusionary rule
was envisioned as protecting fourth amendment rights by removing
from the government any evidentiary incentive for disregarding
those rights. I7
The exclusionary rule was extended to state criminal prosecu-
tions in Mapp v. Ohio.' 8 In Mapp, the Court held that the fourth
amendment was applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment and, therefore, that all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
fourth amendment was inadmissible in a state court proceeding. ' 9
Although the fourth amendment requires that "no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause,'' 20 searches and seizures,
under certain circumstances, may be made without a warrant. 21 In
Wong Sun v. United States,22 the Court stated that where an officer
16. Id. at 393. This rationale was adopted in Mappv. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656(1961), in which
the Court extended the exclusionary rule to states under the fourth and fmurteenih amendments. Id.
17. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960). This rationale has been repeated in cases
subsequent to Elkins. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486, 492 (1976) (denying habeas
corpus relief to state prisoner in order to raise unconstitutional search and seizure defense to
introduction of evidence when state has provided earlier opportunity for fourth amendment claim);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (holding that grand jlry questions based on
illegally seized evidence did not violate defendant's fourth amendment rights); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that evidence illegally seized by the government is inadmissible in
state courts).
18. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). In so holding, the Cuoir in Mapp uverrlid Wolfl v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), in which the Court held that althogh the foirth amendment was in-
corporated by the fotirteenth amendment, state coiirts were not required to exclude evidence oh-
tained in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 27-28. The Court in Mapp stressed the need for
healthy federalism by avoidance of needless inconstitencies between federal and state ciirts con-
cerning the admissibility of illegally seized evidence under the fourth amendment. 367 U.S. at 657.
In addition, the Coort's holding sotight to preserve judicial integrity by not allowing state coirts,
throu.gh admission of illegally seized evidence, to participate in or perpetuate ,mconstittitional state
practices. Id. at 659.
The dissent in Mapp urged that '[ilt would not be proper to expect or impose any precise
equivalence, either as regards the scope of the right or the means of its implementation, between the
requirements of the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments." Id. at 679 (Frankfurter, Whitaker,
Harlan,J.J., dissenting).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The police most, whenever practicable, obtain advance idicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedire. See, e.g., Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding umconstitutional electronic sorveillance condiccted without prior
procurement of warrant); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (evidence seized afterarrest based on
less than probable cause was inadmissible); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (eviden-
ce seized by forcible entry into defendant's apartment in his absence and without consent and
without warrant held inadmissible). Most searches, however, are made without a search warrant. L.
TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 100-05 (1967).
21. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971). A categorical exception to the
warrant requirement is made where a search is condcted incident to a lawfil arrest. See, e.g., United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (allowing full search of arrestee's person following lawfil
custodial arrest); Gistafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (companion case to Robinson); Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (restricting the scope of search incident to a lawful arrest).
The second exception to the warrant requirement is made where exigent circumstances are
present. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); cf, Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1964). See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (allowing
blood extraction from defendant where delay to procure warrant threatened destruction of evidence);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (allowing warrantless search of atomobile due to its
ambulatory nature).
22. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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makes a warrantless arrest, the quantum of information upon
which the officer bases that arrest must equal the probable cause
required to justify issuance of a warrant.
23
When a warrantless search and seizure amounting to an arrest
occurs, however, cases decided after Wong Sun have interpreted the
fourth amendment as requiring something less than probable
cause. In Terry v. Ohio, 24 the Court held constitutional a.eizure and
search of suspected conspirators where less than probable cause for
an arrest existed. 25 Rather than applying the probable cause
requirement of the fourth amendment, the Court ruled that the
actions of the police officer in that case must be tested by the fourth
amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
26
In each case, a court determines the constitutional
reasonableness of the search and seizure by balancing the relative
interests sought to be protected by the individual and the
government. 27 In addition, the search and seizure must be based on
specific articulable facts 28 and rational inferences from which a
detached and neutral magistrate can judge the reasonableness of
the search and seizure in light of the particular circumstances.
2 9
23. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963). The Coutrt reasoned that relaxation
of the fundamental requirement of probable cause would "leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of
the officers' whim or caprice." Id(citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
24. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
25. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968). The police officer in Terry stopped and frisked the
defendants, id. at 6, after observing them make numerous passes in front of a local store. During the
course of the frisk, two unregistered firearms were discovered and seized. Id. at 7. The trial court
referred to the police action in Terry as a stop and frisk, as distinguished from an arrest and full blown
search. Id. at 8. The state asserted that stop and frisk activity was, on a continuum of police activity,
lower than a search and seizure and, thus, was not subiect to the proscriptions of the fourth amend-
ment. Id. at 10-11. This line of reasoning was used earlier in People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 252
N.Y.S.2d 458, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965), where the Coutrt stated that
"[t]he sense of exterior touch here involved is not very far different from the sense of sight or hearing
- senses upon which police customarily act." 201 N.E.2d at 35. The Cotrt in Terry reiected this
reasoning, however, and held that the stop and frisk was a seizure and search subject to the fotrth
amendment. 392 U.S. at 19.
26. 392 U.S. at 20-21.
27. Id. at 21. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967), the Couirt explained
that "[i]n cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be obtained,
'probable cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the con-
stitutional mandate of reasonableness." Id. Thus, where a warrant is not reqttired, the standard of
reasonableness might be lower than probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (articulable facts and rational inferences tistifying reasonable suspicion); cf,
Delaware v. Prouse, -U S., 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1400 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968) (stop and search reasonable where officer has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed
and dangerous individual). Thus, a warrantless search and seizure may be constitutionally
reasonable in situations lacking probable cause where the governmental interest in making the search
and seizure outweighs the invasion of protected fourth amendment rights which the search and
seizure entails. Id. at 21.
28. The Court, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21 n.18, stressed that the "demand for specificity
in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Four-
th Amendment .jurisprudence." Id.
29. Id. at 20-21. See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 354-57 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 54-60 (1967); Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 110-115 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963). The Court
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Based on Terry, therefore, the constitutionality of a
warrantless 30 search or seizure must be determined by a two step
analysis. First, the court must determine whether the challenged
police action constitutes a search or seizure subject to the fourth
amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 3t Upon a finding that a search or seizure occurred, the
court must then determine whether the search or seizure was
reasonable by balancing the competing interests of the government
and the individual. 
32
In Delaware v. Prouse, the Court applied this two-phase analysis
to random investigatory seizures of automobile drivers by police
seeking to discover automobile registration and driver's license
violations. 33 Citing earlier cases, the Court summarily declared
that stopping an automobile and briefly detaining its occupants
constituted a seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. 34  Proceeding to judge the fourth amendment
reasonableness of the seizure caused by the investigatory stop, the
Court applied the same balancing test used in earlier cases, under
which the reasonableness of a particular law enforcement practice is
judged by "balancing its intrusion on the fourth amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests. '
35
In weighing the balance in the case at bar, the Court in Prouse
reviewed and contrasted its earlier decisions in similar cases
involving investigatory stops of automobiles where there is no
suspicion that a criminal violation has taken place. 36 The Court
in Terry cited one governmental interest as that of effective crime prevention. 392 U.S. at 22. In ad-
dition, there was a more immediate interest, kinder the particular facts, of the police officer in taking
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not armed with a dangeroIs
weapon that could unexpectedly be used against him. Id. at 23.
30. The police must still obtain a warrant whenever practicable in advance of the search or
seizure. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1379 U.S. 1,20 (1968). See also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). However, today an arrest warrant is not required in
felony cases even where there is time to procure one. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-
24, (1976).
31. 392 U.S. at 16.
32. Id. at 27.
33. U.S. at __, 99 S. Ct. at 1396-1401.
34. Id. at __, 99 S. Ct. at 1396. See also United States v. Martinez- Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556
(1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). Cf, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
16(1968).
35. -U.S. at__, 99 S. Ct. at 1396. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968), the Court
phrased the objective reasonableness test as follows: "[W]oild the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the ac-
tion taken was appropriate?" Cf., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964); Carrol v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 149, (1925).
36. __U.S. at __ , 99 S. Ct. at 1396 (1979). Cases dealing with investigatory detentions or
seizures have arisen in other contexts. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, -U.S. - , 99 S. Ct.
2248 (1979) (physical restraint of defendant at stationhouse for purposes of investigatory quiestioning
where probable cause to arrest was lacking held unconstitutional); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
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noted that while it had previously held roving border patrol
searches which lacked any articulable suspicion of criminal activity
unconstitutional, 31 it had upheld similarly unfounded en masse
border checkpoint stops because of their less intrusive effect on
motorists' fourth amendment interests. 38
The investigatory stops in Prouse stood on the same footing as
the roving border patrol held unconstitutional earlier by the
Court. 39 The Court conceded that "the States have a vital interest
in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to
operate motor vehicles, that these vehicles are fit for safe operation,
and hence that licensing, registration, and vehicle inspection
requirements are being observed." ' 40 The Court ruled, however,
that given (1) the available alternative methods of ensuring that
only registered drivers use the highways, 4' (2) the incremental
contribution of random spot checks to affect that purpose, (3) the
possible dangers of unconstrained police discretion in the field, 42
and (4) the psychological intrusion visited upon drivers due to the
stops, 43 the random stops involved constituted an unreasonable
721 (1969) (repeated warrantless detention of suspect at stationhoitse for fingerprinting held un-
consuit itional).
37. -. U.S. at __, 99 S. Ct. at 1397. Prouse was referring to United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873-84 (1975), in which the Court considered the fourth amendment ramifications
of roving border patrol stops and searches for illegal aliens not limited to the border alone. Although
recognizing an important governmental interest in developing effective measures to prevent the
illegal entry of aliens at the borders, the Court in Brgnoni-Ponce declared that even minimal fourth
amendment intrusions, such as brief investigatory stops removed from the border itself, required
some articiilable suspicion on which to base the stop. Id. at 881-82. This minimal requirement reflec-
ts the Court's concern for the important fourth amendment interest of law-abiding residents living
near the border to be free from arbitrary border patrol stops. Id. at 882-83.
38. -- U.S. at __ , 99 S. Ct. at 1397, referring to United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976). In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court ruled that the practical impossibility of identifying a
possible carrier of illegal aliens, the need to prevent the flow of illegal aliens into the country, and the
narrower margin for abusive discretionary police action at designated checkpoints .itstified such
checkpoint stops even when no suispicion of illegal activity existed. Id. at 556-57. The Cokurt in that
case declared that while the objective intrusion of the stop existed in both Martinez-Fuerte and Brignoni-
Ponce, the less intrusive nature of checkpoint stops was its distinguishing and saving feature. Id. at
558. Thus, in view of the countervailing state interests at stake, and the minimal intrusion involved,
the checkpoint border stops in Martinez-Fuerte were held to be reasonable in spite of the absence of any
,suspicion upon which to base the stops. Id. at 562.
39. -. U.S. at __ , 99 S. Ct. at 398-99.
40.Id. at __,99 S. Ct. at 1398.
41. Id. at., 99 S. Ct. at 1399. The Court suggested that questioning all oncoming traffic at
roadblock-type stops might be one possible alternative. Id. at __, 99 S. Ct. at 1401. The Court also
stated that acting on observed violations of the law was probably the sorest way to locate unlicensed
drivers. Id. at __,99 S. Ct. at 1399.
42. Id. at __, 99 S. Ct. at 1400. The Court pointed out that the practice of random stops was
unlike situations where consent to the regulation was presumed from participation in the regulated
enterprise. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (federal regulation of firearms);
Colonnade Catering Corp v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (federal regulation of liquor). In the
absence ofstich circumstances, "discretion of the official in the field [must] be circumscribed, at least
to some extent. ___U.S. at __, 99 S. Ct. at 1400 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 270 (1973); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967).
43. -U.S. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 1398. The Court likened the stop in Prouse to that in United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), stating that in both cases the stop involved an un-
settling show of authority. Both also involved an interference with the freedom of movement which is
inconvenient and time consuming. -. U.S. at __, 99 S. Ct. 1398.
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invasion of fourth amendment rights. 44 On balance, therefore, the
Court held that in the absence of articulable and reasonable
suspicion that some violation of the law has occurred, a random
stop of a driver in order to check his license and automobile
registration was an unreasonable seizure under the fourth and
fourteenth amendments. 41
The holding in Delaware v. Prouse has an impact on two North
Dakota statutes. 46 The first statute requires that the registration
card for a vehicle shall be carried in the driver's compartment of the
vehicle at all times, subject to inspection by any peace officer or
highway patrolman. 47 The second statute requires every licensee to
have his operator's license in his possession at all times when
operating a motor vehicle, and to display his license upon demand
of any patrolman or peace officer, among others.
48
The scope of the former statute was considered in State v.
Stockert, 49 in which the North Dakota Supreme Court, in dictum,
44. Id at,99 S. Ct. at 1398-1401.
45. Id. at , 99 S. Ct. at 1401. The dissent in Prouse fotnd the Court's allowance of Martinez-
Fuerte-type en masse checkpoint stops lacking any suspicion, and its disallowance of the intermittent
random stops in Prouse, to be inconsistent with the idea of preventing unfounded intrusions into
foirth amendment rights. In addition, while the Court stated that acting on observed violations was
the best was to ascertain which drivers were unlicensed, t. at , 99 S. Ct. at 1399, the dissent
stated that preventing actual violations from occurring in the first place was the object of the stops.
Id. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 1402 (Rehnqtist, .J., dissenting).
46. The text of these two statutes follows. Section 39-04-55 of the North Dakota Century Code
provides as follows:
The registration card issued for a vehicle shall be carried in the driver's compartment
of the vehicle or, in the case of a house trailer or mobile home or a trailer or
semitrailer, regardless of when such vehicle was acqired, inside or on such vehicle, at
all times while the vehicle is being operated uipon a highway in this state. Suich card
shall be sobiect to inspection by any peace officer or highway patrolman. Any person
violating any of the provisions of this section shall be assessed a fee of twenty dollars,
provided that a person cited for violation of this section shall not be found to have com-
mitted a violation if he shall, within forty-eight hours after being cited, prodcle and
display to a peace officer or highway patrolman, or to the hearing official before whom
the person was to appear, a registration card valid at the time the person was cited. A
peace officer or highway patrolman receiving evidence of the existence of a valid
registration card as herein provided shall notify the hearing official of the appropriate
irisdiction of that fact.
N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39 -04 -55 (Sipp. 1979).
Section 39-06-16 of the North Dakota Centuiry Code provides:
Every licensee shall have his operator's license or permit in his immediate possession
at all times when operating a motor vehicle and shall display the same, upon demand
of any court, municipal court, a cotinty justice, a patrolman, peace officer, or field
depuity or inspector of the highway department. However, no person charged with
violating this section shall be convicted or assessed any court costs if he produces in
cdiurt, to the chief of police or in the office of the arresting officer an operator's license
or permit theretofore issued to him and valid and not under suspension, revocation or
cancellation at the time ofhis arrest.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-16 (1972).
47. N.D. CENT. COnE § 39-04-55 (Stipp. 1979).
48. N.D. CENT. Co1E § 39-06-16 (1972).
49. 245 N.W.2d 266, 270 (N.D. 1976). State v. Stockert dealt with the admissibility of evidence in
a felony case. The evidence was obtained during a search of the defendant's automobile although no
CASE COMMENT
stated that a statute requiring drivers to carry their registration
cards "does not authorize an officer to. . . stop single automo-
biles. . . in the absence of any indication of violation of law or
ordinance. "50
While Stockert declares that the automobile registration
statutes may not be used as a subterfuge for an otherwise
unconstitutional investigation of other crimes, Prouse seems to
extend Stockert and require some articulable suspicion prior to a
vehicle stop even if the avowed purpose of the stop is actually to
check the driver's registration and license pursuant to the statutes.
Thus, the holding in Prouse52 should be equally applicable to both
the North Dakota registration and driver's license statutes.
CORY CARLSON
reasonable sispicion ustified the search. The state attempted to 1,stifN , the search on the basis of'sec-
tion 39-04-55 of the North Dakota Century Code. which requires a driver to keep his automobile
registration card in his automobile at all times. The court stated that the search was impermissible
under both state and federal constitutional standards. Stockert was reversed and remanded for a new
trial Id. at271.
50. State v. Stockert. 245 N.W.2d 266. 270 (N.D. 1976). "[Section 39-04-55] cannot be tsed as
a mere shibterf i ge to obtain intfbrmation or evidence not related to the licensing req irement. - Id..
(citing People v. Harr, 93 I11. App.2d 146. 235 N.E.2d 1 (1968), and cases cited therein).
51. N.D. CENT CoDE § 39-04-55 (Stpp. 1979).
52. __U.S. at __. 99 S. Ct. at 1401.

